This Article explores the case for including losses of foreign (non-U.S.) lives and settlements in the estimated cost to the United States of unmitigated climate change in the future. The inclusion of losses of such foreign lives and settlements in cost benefit analysis (CBA) could have large implications not only for U.S. climate change policy but also for policies adopted by other nations and the practice of CBA generally. One difficult problem is how to assess U.S. residents' willingness to pay to prevent the losses of foreign lives and settlements. This Article discusses internet-based surveys that are a first step toward filling the empirical void in the literature regarding the measurement of U.S. residents' willingness to pay to prevent the losses of foreign lives and settlements. The survey results reported in this Article suggest that U.S. residents substantially value foreign lives and settlements. Such results make the implicit assumption of CBAs as they are currently undertaken -that U.S. residents would be willing to pay nothing to save foreign lives and settlements -very hard to maintain.
I. Introduction
How much unmitigated climate change would cost the United States in the future is an important question for those interested in the debate over how much the United
States should invest now in efforts to mitigate or prevent climate change. A cost benefit analysis (CBA) for any climate change policy or regulation, in effect, compares the costs to the United States of taking mitigation and prevention measures with the costs to the United States of not taking those measures. Thus, any CBA for climate change that is or will be used for political, legal or regulatory purposes will be determined in significant part by the methodology used for estimating the costs to residents of the United States of unmitigated climate change.
The current approaches to assessing the cost to U.S. residents of unmitigated climate change in the future exclude any values for foreign lives or foreign civilizations that might be damaged or destroyed as a result of climate change. i Current CBAs for the costs to Americans of climate change do include dollar sums to reflect estimates of what U.S. residents would pay to prevent the loss of U.S. lives and the loss of U.S.
"settlements" ii that might result from future climate change, such as deaths of U.S.
residents from heat waves and losses of coastal towns and places of natural beauty within the United States from rising sea levels. What those estimates do not at all reflect, even nominally, is the welfare Americans would lose, and would be willing to pay money not to lose, when foreign lives are lost due to climate-related disease and great coastal cities and sites in foreign lands are submerged due to climate-related flooding or other adverse effects from climate change.
This Article explores the case for including in CBAs these now-ignored losses in foreign lives and settlements as part of estimates of costs to the United States from unmitigated climate change in the future. The basic rationale for using CBAs at all --a preference-aggregation, social-utilitarian rationale --argues in favor of including the welfare loss U.S. residents would bear as a result of the loss of foreign lives and settlements. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that observable market data does not and cannot capture the dimensions of this welfare loss, and that survey or other stated preferences methods of assessing U.S. residents' willingness to pay to prevent such loss are therefore needed.
The question of what is and is not included in CBAs for climate change for the United States is important because CBAs frame and drive policy debates in the United
States to a very substantial degree, and what the United States does or does not do regarding climate change almost certainly will have a large impact on the willingness of other countries to take measures to help prevent or mitigate climate change. Moreover, the inclusion of foreign lives and settlements in CBAs for climate change almost certainly would encourage the inclusion of foreign lives and settlements by U.S.
policymakers in CBAs used to inform non-climate-change policies and by policymakers in countries other than the United States. Thus, while this Article focuses on the United
States and climate change, it has implications beyond the United States and outside the (admittedly broad) context of climate change.
A key problem in including foreign lives and settlements in CBAs is how to reliably measure the willingness to pay to preserve foreign lives and settlements. In the view of some economists, "talk is cheap," and hence surveys or other means of recording stated preferences are unrevealing as to people's real preferences, that is, preferences they would really act upon. Such surveys, however, could provide useful information regarding U.S. residents' relative valuation of U.S. lives and settlements on the one hand and foreign lives and settlements on the other. But there have been no published reports of efforts to measure U.S. residents' relative willingness to pay to save U.S. and foreign lives and settlements from the adverse physical effects of climate change. Indeed, there appear to be no published studies attempting to capture U.S. residents stated willingness to pay to save foreign lives and settlements relative to U.S. lives and settlements in any context.
This Article discusses surveys I conducted that are a first step toward filling the empirical void in the literature. The survey results reported in this Article suggest that U.S. residents equally value U.S. and foreign lives and settlements. Such results do not necessarily prove that U.S. residents would individually be willing to pay the same amount of money to prevent the loss of foreign lives and settlements as they would to prevent the loss of U.S. lives and settlements. But such results do make the implicit assumption of CBAs as they are currently undertaken -that U.S. residents do not at all value foreign lives and settlements -very hard to maintain.
Part I of the Article sets the stage by briefly summarizing the best current estimates of the effects of unmitigated climate change on different regions of the world.
The key point is that, under current estimates of gradual, unmitigated climate change, the direct physical impacts of climate change will be less severe in the United States than in much of the rest of the world. Part II develops the argument for considering the costs to U.S. residents of the loss of foreign lives and settlements and explains why revealed preferences via observable real-economy transactions cannot capture the true dimensions of those costs. Part III explores possible approaches to surveying U.S. residents regarding foreign lives and settlements. This Part then discusses surveys that were designed to elicit information regarding U.S. residents' comparative valuation of the loss of lives and settlements within and without the United States. Part V explores some implications of the survey results.
II. The Regional Impacts of Climate Change
In the United States, acceptance of a precautionary approach to climate change is largely limited to certain academic and activist circles, and generally rejected by policymakers and politically-influential economists. (Kysar 2006) The assessments upon which US policymakers (and perhaps, policymakers in many other countries, either explicitly or implicitly) rely is not solely or primarily a scenario of rapid and hence broadly catastrophic climate change, but rather a blend of the catastrophic scenario and the non-catastrophic scenario, with the latter usually weighed as substantially more likely than the former. This blended approach does not ignore catastrophic possibilities but also does not "overweigh" them on the basis of an a priori commitment to precaution. The leading quantitative assessment of comparative regional vulnerabilities using the blended approach remains the 2000 study by Nordhaus and Boyer. As Table One, adapted from Nordhaus and Boyer, (Nordhaus and Boyer 2000, p. 91) shows, the adverse impacts outside the United States are estimated to be much greater than the adverse impacts within the United States. According to their estimates, climate change will result in a 1.88 percent decline in GDP for the worlds' population as a whole, but only a .45 decline in GDP for the United States. 
III. The Rationale for Assessing The Costs of Foreign Lives and Settlements Through Stated Preferences
One of the oft-cited appeals of CBAs -and welfare economics generally -is that it purports to be value "neutral" in that it generally does not ex ante or a priori exclude items for valuation on the basis of some criteria imposed by the policymaker who would make use of the CBA. That people value fancy sneakers or gigantic cars in fact means that those things and the loss of those things count and should count in CBAs, even if, on some accounts, people should not value those things highly. What matters is that people are simply willing to pay for these things.
The neutrality principle that broadly animates the entire practice of conducting CBAs means that that willingness to pay to save foreign lives or settlements should be reflected in CBAs. That such willingness to pay does not or might not reflect "selfish" motivations but rather may reflect "altruistic" motivations is irrelevant. Willingness on the part of U.S. residents to pay to save Venice, Italy from sinking may not properly be understood as "altruistic" even if they have no intention of travelling there any time soon. The more important point, though, is that there is no sound theoretical case for excluding altruistically-driven willingness to pay from CBAs (Zerbe 2007; Johansson 1992 Indeed, given cultural and historic ties to the United States, U.S. residents might pay a great deal to prevent losses just in the British Isles and Ireland.
Another important reason U.S. residents may not now give more to save foreign lives and settlements, particularly to poor regions such as sub-Saharan Africa, is that such giving is chilled by a kind of prisoner's dilemma dynamic. In a justly famous article, Sen argued that individuals faced with the decision to contribute to a collective good such as reductions in pollution from recycling face a classic prisoner's dilemma choice. (Sen 1973 ) If they knew that others would recycle all their bottles so that pollution were reduced, they could have their cake and eat it too -not have the bother of recycling their bottles but see and enjoy a reduction in pollution. On the other hand, if they do not know that others will recycle and others do not in fact recycle, they could be made worse off by recycling themselves, as they would then have assumed the burden of recycling without there being any possibility for an appreciable net reduction in pollution. These individuals would be willing to enter into an agreement with others to recycle, as they would be better off if they could see pollution reduced even if they had to assume the burden of recycling. But since binding agreements are not feasible, the individuals simply may not recycle at all.
Extending the Sen recycling example to climate change, individual U.S. residents may not contribute to helping foreigners avoid or adapt to climate change or other challenges because they would like to assume that others -other individual U.S.
residents, other foreigners, other kinds of entities (governments, domestic and foreign, or international organizations) -will make contributions that achieve that purpose so that they do not have to do so to save foreign lives and settlements. Conversely, individual U.S. residents may not contribute more because they may fear that others will not do likewise, so that the total funds available will be insufficient to make a difference in saving foreign lives and settlements. U.S. residents also may fear that their contributions will not be well-used by recipient organizations and hence will be ineffective. The climate change problem is so technically challenging that the mitigation efforts to which they could contribute may simply not have any real impact, or that at least may be a comprehensible fear.
Moreover, technical difficulties aside, money contributed to foreign charities for humanitarian purposes (climate-change related or not) could be misused as a result of corruption and conflict within the foreign countries, and U.S. residents may not give or support aid on that account. Broadly speaking, corruption is perceived to be a much greater problem in the developing countries that would be most severely impacted by unmitigated climate change, such as the countries of sub-Saharan Africa or Bangladesh.
The popular press not infrequently features a report of foreign aid that has been appropriated by corrupt leaders of desperately poor countries. it. The surveys also can be constructed to try to lessen distortions from free riding and corruption/misuse of aid concerns, as discussed in Part III below.
IV. Stated Preference Surveys and the Value of Foreign Lives and Settlements
This Part explores the problems of stated preference surveys as a means of assessing Americans' willingness to pay to prevent the loss of foreign lives and settlements to unmitigated climate change in the future. This Part considers some general problems with stated preference approaches and also problems that are specific to the climate change context, and considers possible responses. Finally, two surveys I administered are discussed.
A. Designing and Interpreting Stated Preference Surveys
Critics of stated preference methods argue that such methods are subject to excessive manipulation on the part of the design givers, a fact that they argue proves that the survey results are not grounded in meaningful, true preferences. For example, they point out that the order of the items to be valued on a multiple-item survey can substantially affect results: put a different item first and one gets different results. They also argue that survey respondents may provide very different responses based on minor changes in the factual information provided them, and that survey respondents also may intentionally inflate their responses if they guess that the surveys may be used to support policies or court judgments that big companies -not they -would have to pay. (Murphy et al 2005; Doshi 2008; Cross 1989) These critics of stated preference surveys also have questioned whether surveys capture willingness to pay at all, rather than certain feelings or sensitivities to social norms. (Diamond & Hausman 1994) In particular, they argue that results just show that respondents get a sense of "warm glow" or moral comfort in saying they would be willing to pay to prevent some harm even though they really would not be willing to pay the amount they report -or perhaps anything. They also argue that respondents offer their responses to impress the surveyors as to their generosity and conformity with social ideals, even though, again, they would not be willing to pay what they say they would be willing to pay. According to these critics, the results of these surveys therefore inflate the real willingness to pay of surveyed individuals.
xii The manipulation and overstatement or inflation problems, to the extent they generally do pertain, can be mitigated by reframing stated preference methods as an inquiry not into absolute willingness to pay but rather comparative willingness to pay. The principal means of tackling this challenge is to structure the surveys around physical impacts that are or would be associated with climate change but that are also within or close enough to the respondents' experience that they can readily imagine and comprehend them. Thus, in the surveys discussed below, respondents are asked about adverse happenings now, not at an undefined future date, and in a particular region of the world, rather than throughout the planet. And the happenings, such as flooding or deaths from heat waves, are ones that can be readily imagined by respondents because, as we all know, even now there are major floods and deadly heat waves, at least in some parts of the world.
The level of specificity of climate change surveys is another challenging question. In order to determine how much Americans value the settlements of Italy, we could estimate and then add up the costs Americans will bear from adverse effects in any given region or part or city of that country. That approach, however, would require an enormous number of surveys. One could instead ask about a single identified and well-known city in the nation at issue -Venice in the case of Italy, for example -but then it would not be clear whether the answers reflected attitudes toward losses in just Venice or more broadly Italy or even more broadly Europe.
One approach would be to ask about an unspecified city or area in the nation or region at issue while giving enough facts that the respondent can imagine the general nature or character of the city or region at issue. This approach may be grounded and specific enough to allow respondents to answer meaningfully while remaining general enough to capture attitudes about regions or nations rather than attitudes about just one place. The surveys described below adopt this intermediate approach but, ideally, we would combine various approaches and compare results. More generally-worded-surveys combined with highly-place-specific ones would provide a fuller account of stated preferences. That kind of project, however, requires that the principal object of this Article first be achieved -that the costs Americans bear as a result of the loss of foreign lives and settlements be accepted as a category of costs that require real consideration and hence study.
Finally, any climate-change-related survey needs to try address two principal reasons revealed preferences may be less than fully instructive -deflated or depressed giving or support for public expenditure due to free-riding and foreign corruption concerns. If
Americans are concerned about the free riding of other wealthy nations, or more generally about free riding by other potential givers whether American or foreign, that concern can be allayed by specifying that there has already been substantial giving by others. If Americans are tempted to free ride on giving by others, telling them that others have given substantially but cannot or will not give any more may also may be helpful.
With regard to the foreign corruption concern at all, surveys can include wording to provide respondents some assurance that contributions would be well spent for their stated purposes. In the surveys discussed below, respondents are told the charity at issue already has raised much of the needed money (which address the free-riding concern somewhat) and that the charity is highly reputable (which addresses the corruption concern, at least to an extent).
B. The Flood and Heat Wave Surveys
I administered two kinds of surveys to respondents who are part of an internetbased subject pool recruited and organized by researchers at Syracuse University. There is a City in Southeast Asia that is facing severe heat waves this summer. Several thousands of the residents of the City are at risk of death from the severe heat. The City lacks the resources to re-locate its threatened population to airconditioned structures or to cooler areas outside the City. A highly reputable charity is raising money for the emergency re-location of the City residents who are most at risk of death from the severe heat. The charity has already collected much of the needed money but requires some additional contributions to finance the emergency effort. Unless the charity can provide the needed financing for the emergency effort, it is highly likely that several thousands of the City residents will die from heatstroke. How much money would you be willing to contribute to the charity to help finance the emergency re-location?
In the flood survey, respondents received one of four variants of the survey.
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The variants differed only in the location of the City facing flooding, with one variant addressing an unidentified city in the United States, an unidentified city in North Africa, an unidentified city in Asia, and an unidentified city in Europe. Respondents were told the City at issue had historic significance and to underscore that point were also told that the City attracted at least 250,000 American visitors as tourists each year (which is a number of tourists that certain cities in each of these regions do attract annually). The goal of the survey was to isolate valuation of foreign settlements as opposed to foreign lives, and hence each variant of the survey provided that the structures of the City would be destroyed from flooding but the population could be re-located. For example, the text of the North Africa variant read as follows:
There is a City in East Asia that was established hundreds of years ago and is known for its historic areas. Approximately 250,000 Americans visit the City each year. The City is being threatened by a flood that can only be prevented if new levees are constructed immediately. The population of the City could be safely re-located if there is a flood, but the flood would destroy the physical structures in the City. A highly reputable charity is collecting money to finance the construction of the levees needed to prevent the flooding. The charity has already collected much of the needed money but requires some additional contributions to have enough to finance the construction. Unless the charity can provide the needed financing, it is highly likely that the levees will not be constructed in time and that the City will be flooded. How much money would you be willing to contribute to the charity to help fund the construction of the levees?
Rather than asking respondents for a specific dollar figure, respondents were asked to pick one of several levels or brackets, ranging from "Less than $1" to "More than $5,000." The bracket approach was designed to capture the general intensity of respondents' enthusiasm for giving. In coding and comparing the results among respondent groups to generate means and test for statistically significant differences, the brackets were converted into a 1 to 7 scale, with "Less than $1" equaling a 1 and "More than $5,000" equaling a 7. Respondents were also asked for income and other personal information, including how much they travel outside the United States.
The results do provide some modest support for the view that Americans value American lives and settlements more than foreign ones. As Figures These results also suggest a certain favoritism toward Europe among respondents.
The mean contribution for Europe on the heat wave study is greater than the mean contribution for Africa, Asia, or Latin America, and the difference between the European and Latin American means is statistically significant (p<.01). xix The mean contribution for Europe on the flooding survey was greater than that for Africa and Asia, and in the case of both Africa and Asia, the difference was statistically significant. An even lower percentage of respondents selected the lowest contribution level on the flooding survey for the European city than for the U.S. city (or for the city in Asia or Africa), suggesting, perhaps, then when it comes to historic settlements, European ones may be broadly more highly valued than even American ones. Overall, the results tend to support the view that assessments of Americans willingness to pay to prevent losses from climate change should take account of Europe, even though much of Europe, as of now, is too wealthy and too little threatened to plausibly make a case for needing substantial US government aid or private charity.
The most striking thing about the survey results, however, is how similar the valuations are between American lives and settlements on the one hand and foreign lives and settlements on the other. A majority of respondents (indeed 65% or more) in all the variants of the heat wave surveys and the flooding surveys reported that they would be willing to contribute $1 or more; in other words, the majority clearly did not select no or zero contribution for American or foreign cities. Even more importantly, the differences between the mean responses for American lives and settlements and foreign lives and settlements on the other were not large, and in most cases were not statistically significant at any conventionally-employed significance threshold. On the heat wave survey, the only statistically significant differences between the US mean and a foreign mean was between the mean for the United States on the one hand and that for Latin America on the other. Moreover, even that statistically significant difference seems small when viewed in absolute terms (.77 on a range of 1 to 7).
On the flooding survey, there was no statistically significant difference between the mean for the United States and Europe. There were statistically significant differences between the United States mean and the Asia and North Africa means, but again the differences seem small when viewed in absolute terms (.41 and .48 on a range of 1 through 7). Moreover, the statistically significant differences for Latin America on the heat wave survey and for Asia and Africa on the flooding survey may not indicate a lower willingness to pay for lives or settlements in these regions so much as greater concern about corruption and ineffectiveness of aid there (notwithstanding the survey language labeling the charity as "highly reputable").
The ratio of the United States means to the foreign means gives the same overall impression. The mean contribution for a foreign country was not below "2" (that is, between 1 dollar and 10 dollars) on any variant of either study. The mean contribution for the United States approached but did not reach "3" (between 10 dollars and 50 dollars). The modal response for five of the seven foreign variants was "2," whereas the modal response for the two United States variants was "3." One possibly crude interpretation of these results is that, at most, the average valuation of an American life or settlement was no more than 50 times that of a foreign life or settlement. A 50 to 1
American/foreign valuation ratio may not obviously smack of transnational egalitarianism, but 50 to 1 is a far cry from the 2000 to 1 ratio that conceivably could be inferred from patterns of actual US foreign development aid to certain of the poorest nations of the world.
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V. Implications of Survey Results
The most immediate implication of the survey results is to suggest that more --and differently worded and administered surveys --are needed to develop our understanding of U.S. residents' stated preferences. If the initial surveys reported here had suggested something consonant with current CBA practice --that is, they had suggested a zero or near zero valuation of foreign lives and settlements--then one might plausibly argue that further studies would not be in order. But that the reported survey results suggest a valuation completely at odds with CBA practice provides a compelling reason for investing in more research to evaluate, as best as possible, how U.S. residents do value foreign lives and settlements relative to U.S. lives and settlements in the context of climate change.
If future studies have similar results to the ones reported on here, then it would be appropriate to consider an upward revision in the estimate of net costs to the United 
VI. Conclusion
In the context of unmitigated climate change, the losses in welfare to U.S.
residents may result more from physical impacts outside our borders than within. Yet current CBA approaches ignore that potential loss of welfare. That loss -as measured by willingness to pay to prevent the loss -cannot be readily measured by revealed preferences, and so stated preference methods, however imperfect, are important to provide a broader basis on which to approximate the magnitude of that loss. This Article has reported on results of an internet survey that suggest that U.S. residents value U.S. Order No. 12,114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (Jan. 4, 1979 . But that Order has been substantially ignored, and extraterritoriality has not been a concern of subsequent executive orders regarding CBAs. Kysar, D. A. and Y.-W. Li (2008) xii There are other criticism as well, including the criticism that answer responses are insensitive to the scope of the loss to be avoided (that is, how many of an item or entity will be saved), which is also inconsistent with revealed preference, market behavior, in which willingness to pay generally corresponds to the scope or magnitude of the good or goods at issue. Whether the scope of loss or quantity objection is well-grounded depends in part on one's interpretation of the bodies of CVM studies as a whole. But even if surveys do not reflect well per-unit, scope-sensitive valuations of a particular good or goods, they may capture valuation of the general category of the good -how much people value polar bears generally, as opposed to how much they value 100 as opposed to 1000 bears. This is a plausible interpretation because published surveys have not generally given respondents enough information to assess the significance of 100 versus 1000 bears, and generally have not focused respondents on the issue by asking them to provide a valuation for 100 and 1000 bears. Instead most surveys are between-subject surveys where respondents are asked to assess the value of only one loss of a particular, stated scope or quantity. Extrapolating this point to the context of surveying about the value of foreign lives and settlements, one might reasonably argue that such studies may not capture per-unit valuation of foreign lives and settlements as much as they may capture valuation of foreign lives and settlements generally or valuation of particular categories of foreign lives and settlements (e.g., European or Latin American lives and settlements). xiii We can obtain comparative data in stated preference studies in a number of ways. Within a single group of subjects, subjects can be asked to rank or allocate a budget with respect to various goods or to choose between two possible donations or contributions involving different goods, in which case they presumably will choose which they think is more valuable. In between-subject studies, the subjects in different groups can be given different goods to value. The former kind of survey may capture better the respondents' conscious attitudes -the attitudes they believe they have -regarding the comparative value of the items that can be saved. The latter kind of survey, by contrast, may better capture both conscious and unconscious attitudes that affect valuation. This Article discusses only between-group surveys regarding the comparative valuation of American and foreign lives and settlements: future work could and should explore whether surveys where a single group comparatively values foreign lives and settlements yields different results from between-subjects surveys. (arguing that cost-benefit analysis devalues human life and is contrary to common intuitions and values). It would seem even more ethically problematic to proceed on the assumption that only U.S. lives have value to U.S. residents and that foreign lives have zero value, which appears to be the assumption of current CBA practice.
